Detecting anomalous inputs is critical for safely deploying deep learning models in the real world. Existing approaches for detecting out-of-distribution (OOD) examples work well when evaluated on natural samples drawn from a sufficiently different distribution than the training data distribution. However, in this paper, we show that existing detection mechanisms can be extremely brittle when evaluating on inputs with minimal adversarial perturbations which don't change their semantics. Formally, we introduce a novel and challenging problem, Robust Outof-Distribution Detection, and propose an algorithm that can fool existing OOD detectors by adding small perturbations to the inputs while preserving their semantics and thus the distributional membership. We take a first step in solving this challenge, and propose an effective algorithm called ALOE, which performs robust training by exposing the model to both adversarially crafted inlier and outlier examples. Our method can be flexibly combined with, and render existing methods robust. On common benchmark datasets, we show that ALOE substantially improves the robustness of state-of-the-art OOD detection, with 58.4% AUROC improvement on CIFAR-10 and 46.59% improvement on CIFAR-100. Finally, we provide theoretical analysis for our method, further justifying the empirical results above.
Introduction
Machine learning models typically perform well when the training and testing data are sampled independently and identically from the same distribution. However, models in deployment can fail in catastrophic ways when the test data distribution differs from the distribution of the training data. In particular, high-capacity neural networks can wrongly classify inputs from unknown classes (i.e., out-of-distribution) into known classes with high confidence, which could have extremely high cost. For example, a traffic sign classification model used for autonomous driving systems may predict label "speed-limit-100" with high confidence for an anomalous scene without any traffic sign. This can trigger wrong actions for the car and cause unanticipated and potentially catastrophic events. Therefore, detecting autonomous OOD examples has recently been recognized as an important building block for trustworthy AI (Amodei et al., 2016) .
Several previous works address this problem by relying on the raw softmax score (Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2016) , the calibrated softmax score (Liang et al., 2017; Guo et al., 2017) , or the Mahalanobis distance based confidence score (Lee et al., 2018) derived from a neural network. These approaches have been demonstrated to work well when evaluated on OOD images that are sampled from a sufficiently different distribution than the training distribution. However, in this paper, we argue about their inadequacy of their evaluation methods, and demonstrate that we can adversarially construct images by adding minimal semantic-preserving perturbations which can cause failure in existing OOD detectors.
Formally, we introduce a novel and challenging problem called robust out-of-distribution detection. We show that existing OOD detection algorithms can be easily attacked to produce mistaken OOD prediction under small adversarial perturbations (Papernot et al., 2016; Goodfellow et al., 2014; Biggio et al., 2013; Szegedy et al., 2013) . Specifically, we construct adversarial test examples by adding minimal perturbations so to change the model confidence in the reverse direction. We generate adversarial in-distribution examples such that the model is induced to produce low confidence scores; whereas adversarial OOD examples are constructed to induce the model to produce high confidence scores. Different from the common notion, the adversarial examples in our work are meant to fool the OOD detectors, rather than the original image classification model. It is also worth noting that the perturbation is sufficiently small so that the visual semantics as well as true distributional membership remain the same. Yet worryingly, state-of-the-art OOD detectors can fail to distinguish the samples under such adversarial attacks. Scant attention has been paid to making the OOD detectors robust against minimal input perturbations.
To address the challenge , we propose an effective method, ALOE, that improves the robust OOD detection performance. Specifically, we perform robust training by exposing the model to two types of perturbed adversarial examples. For in-distribution training data, we create a perturbed example by searching in its -ball that maximizes the negative log likelihood. In addition, we also utilize an auxiliary unlabaled dataset as in Hendrycks et al. (2018) , and create corresponding perturbed outlier example by searching in its -ball that maximizes the KL-divergence between model output and a uniform distribution. The overall training objective of ALOE can be viewed as an adversarial min-max game. We show that on several benchmark datasets, ALOE can improve the robust OOD detection performance by up to 58.4% compared to previous state-of-the-art method. Our approach can be complemented by techniques such as ODIN (Liang et al., 2017) , and further boost the performance.
We provide analysis and theoretical intuitions for our method. We show that training with perturbed examples from the unlabeled data helps calibrate the error on outliers from an unseen distribution, as long as the unlabeled data distribution and the new outlier distribution have a small divergence with-respect-to (w.r.t.) the hypothesis.
Our main contributions are as follows:
• We identify a novel and challenging out-of-distribution detection problem: the OOD detectors should be robust to minimal semantic-preserving input perturbations. We find that state-of-the-art OOD detection methods fail catastrophically under this new problem setting;
• We propose an effective algorithm, ALOE, that substantially improves the robustness of OOD detectors;
• We empirically analyze our method under different settings and optimization objectives, and provide theoretical insights of our approach.
• We release a code base that integrates the most common OOD detection baselines, and our robust OOD detection methods at: https://github.com/jfc43/ robust-ood-detection. We hope this can ensure reproducibility of all methods, and make it easy for the community to conduct future research on this topic.
Preliminaries
In this section, we will introduce the traditional OOD detection problem and existing approaches.
Traditional Out-of-Distribution Detection Problem
OOD detection can be formulated as a canonical binary classification problem. Suppose we have an in-distribution P X defined on an input space X ⊂ R n . An OOD classifier G : X → {0, 1} is built to distinguish whether an input x is from P X (give it label 1) or not (give it label 0).
In testing, the detector G is evaluated on inputs drawn from a mixture distribution M X×Z defined on X × {0, 1}, where the conditional probability distributions M X|Z=1 = P X and M X|Z=0 = Q X . We assume that Z is drawn uniformly from {0, 1}. Q X is also a distribution defined on X which we refer to it as out-distribution. We use Wasserstein distance W d (P X , Q X ) to measure the distance between two distributions P X and Q X , where d(·, ·) is a distance metric. We say P X and Q X are sufficiently different if W d (P X , Q X ) > ρ, where ρ is a positive constant. We have an assumption that P X and Q X are sufficiently different. We denote by D test in an in-distribution test set drawn from P X , and D test out an out-of-distribution test set drawn from Q X . The detection error of G(x) evaluated under in-distribution P X and out-distribution Q X is defined by
In practice, it can be intractable to directly minimize L(P X , Q X ; G) due to lack of prior knowledge on Q X . In some cases we assume having access to auxiliary data sampled from a distribution U X which is different from both P X and Q X .
Existing Approaches
Recently, several approaches propose to detect OOD examples based on different notions of confidence scores from a neural network f (·), which is trained on a dataset D train in drawn from a data distribution P X,Y defined on X × Y with Y = {1, 2, · · · , K}. Note that P X is the marginal distribution of P X,Y . Based on this notion, we describe a few common methods below.
Maximum Softmax Probability (MSP). Maximum Softmax Probability method is as a common baseline for OOD detection (Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2016) . Given an input image x and a pre-trained neural network f (·), the softmax output of the classifier is computed by
.
A threshold-based detector G(x) relies on the confidence score S(x; f ) = max i F i (x) to make prediction as follows
where γ is the confidence threshold.
ODIN. The original softmax confidence scores used in Hendrycks & Gimpel (2016) can be overconfident. ODIN (Liang et al., 2017) leverages this insight and improves the MSP baseline using the calibrated confidence score instead (Guo et al., 2017) . Specifically, the calibrated confidence score is computed by
where T ∈ R + is a temperature scaling parameter. In addition, ODIN applies small noise perturbation to the inputsx = x − η · sign(−∇ x log S(x; T, f )),
(3) where the parameter η is the perturbation magnitude.
By combining the two components together, ODIN detector G ODIN is given by
In real applications, it may be difficult to know the out-of-distribution samples one will encounter in advance. The hyperparameters of T and η can be tuned instead on a random noise data such as Gaussian or uniform distribution, without requiring prior knowledge of OOD dataset.
Mahalanobis. Lee et al. model the features of training data as class-conditional Gaussian distribution, where its parameters are chosen as empirical class means and empirical covariance of training samples. Specifically, for a given sample x, the confidence score from the -th feature layer is defined using the Mahalanobis distance with respect to the closest class-conditional distribution:
where f (x) is the -th hidden features of DNNs, andμ ,c andΣ are the empirical class means and covariances computed from the training data respectively.
In addition, they use two techniques (1) input pre-processing and (2) feature ensemble. Specifically, for each test sample x, they first calculate the pre-processed samplex by adding the small perturbations as in Liang et al. (2017) :
where η is a magnitude of noise, which can be tuned on the validation data.
The confidence scores from all layers are integrated through a weighted averaging: α M (x ). The weight of each layer α is learned through a logistic regression model, which predicts 1 for in-distribution and 0 for OOD examples. The overall Mahalanobis distance based confidence score is
where b is the bias of the logistic regression model. Putting it all together, the final Mahalanobis detector G Mahalanobis is given by
Outlier Exposure (OE). Outlier Exposure (Hendrycks et al., 2018) makes use of a large, unlabeled auxiliary dataset D OE out drawn from U X to improve out-of-distribution detection. A new classifier, F OE , parameterized by θ, is trained using the following objective minimize
is softmax output of the classification model trained on P X,Y , and U K is the uniform distribution over K classes. The cross-entropy loss L CE (z, y) = − K i=1 y i log z i . This objective regularizes the model F to produce more conservative predictions (uncertainties) on the out-ofdistribution samples. The classifier F OE can be combined with downstream OOD detection methods (such as MSP or ODIN). The corresponding detectors can be constructed as G MSP (x; γ, F OE ), and G ODIN (x; T, η, γ, F OE ), respectively.
Robust Out-of-Distribution Detection
Traditional OOD detection methods described in Section 2.2 are shown to work well when evaluated on natural images that are sampled from a sufficiently different distribution than the training data distribution. However, in this section, we show that existing OOD detectors are extremely brittle and can fail when we add minimal semantic-preserving perturbations to the inputs. We start by introducing a novel problem called robust out-of-distribution detection. Problem Statement. We define Ω(x) to be a set of semantic-preserving perturbations on an input x. For δ ∈ Ω(x), x + δ has the same semantic label as x. This also means that x and x + δ have the same distributional membership (i.e. x and x + δ both belong to in-distribution P X , or out-distribution Q X ). 1 A robust OOD classifier G : X → {0, 1} is built to distinguish whether a perturbed input x + δ is from P X or not. In testing, the detector G is evaluated on perturbed inputs drawn from a mixture distribution M X×Z defined on X × {0, 1}, where the conditional probability distributions M X|Z=1 = P X and M X|Z=0 = Q X . We assume that Z is drawn uniformly from {0, 1} and P X is sufficiently different from Q X . The detection error of G evaluated under in-distribution P X and out-distribution Q X is now defined by
In practice, it can be intractable to directly minimize L(P X , Q X ; G, Ω) due to lack of prior knowledge on Q X . In some cases we assume having access to auxiliary data sampled from a distribution U X which is different from both P X and Q X .
Adversarial Attacks on OOD Detection. We describe adversarial attack algorithms that can show the vulnerability of existing OOD detection approaches. Computing the exact value of detection error defined in equation (9) requires enumerating all possible perturbations. This can be practically intractable given the large space of Ω(x) ⊂ R n . To this end, we propose adversarial attack algorithms that can find the perturbations in Ω(x) to compute a lower bound.
Specifically, we consider image data and small L ∞ norm-bounded perturbations on x since it is commonly used in adversarial machine learning research (Madry et al., 2017; Athalye et al., 2018) . For data point x ∈ R n , a set of adversarial perturbations is defined as
where is the size of small perturbation, which is also called adversarial budget. x + δ is considered valid if the values of x + δ are in the image pixel value range.
For the OOD detection methods based on softmax confidence score (e.g. MSP, ODIN and OE), we describe the attack mechanism in Algorithm 1. Specifically, we construct adversarial test examples by adding small perturbations in B(x, ) so to change the prediction confidence in the reverse direction. To generate adversarial in-distribution examples, the model is induced to output probability distribution that is close to uniform; whereas adversarial OOD examples are constructed to induce the model produce high confidence score. We note here that the adversarial examples here are constructed to fool the OOD detectors G(x), rather than the image classification model f (x).
Algorithm 1 Adversarial attack on OOD detectors based on softmax confidence score.
For the OOD detection methods using Mahalanobis distance based confidence score, we propose an attack algorithm detailed in Algorithm 2. Specifically, we construct adversarial test examples by adding small perturbations in B(x, ) to make the logistic regression detector predict wrongly. Note that in our attack algorithm, we don't perform input pre-processing to compute the Mahalanobis distance based confidence score.
Our attack algorithms assume having access to the model parameters, thus they are white-box attacks. We find that using our attack algorithms, even with very minimal attack strength ( = 1/255 and m = 10), classic OOD detection methods (e.g. MSP, ODIN, Mahalanobis, OE, and OE+ODIN) can fail miserably. For example, the false positive rate of OE method can increase by 95.52% under such attack when evaluated on CIFAR-10 as in-distribution dataset. We provide experimental results in more detail in Section 5.
ALOE: Adversarial Learning with inliner and Outlier Exposure
In this section, we introduce a novel method called Adversarial Learning with inliner and Outlier Exposure (ALOE) to improve the robustness of the OOD detector G(·) built on top of the neural network f (·) against input perturbations. Training Objective. We train our model ALOE against two types of perturbed examples. For in-distribution inputs x ∈ P X , ALOE creates adversarial inlier within the -ball that maximize the negative log likelihood. Training with perturbed examples from the in-distribution helps calibrate the error on inliers, and make the model more invariant to the additive noise. In addition, our method Algorithm 2 Adversarial attack on OOD detector using Mahalanobis distance based confidence score.
leverages an auxiliary unlabeled dataset D OE out drawn from U X as used in Hendrycks et al. (2018) , but in a different objective. While OE directly uses the original images x ∈ D OE out as outliers, ALOE creates adversarial outliers by searching within the -ball that maximize the KL-divergence between model output and a uniform distribution. The overall training objective of F ALOE can be formulated as a min-max game given by
where F θ (x) is the softmax output of the neural network.
To solve the inner max of these objectives, we use the Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) method (Madry et al., 2017) , which is the standard method for large-scale constrained optimization. The hyper-parameters of PGD used in the training will be provided in the experiments.
Once the model F ALOE is trained, it can be used for downstream OOD detection by combining with approaches such as MSP and ODIN. The corresponding detectors can be constructed as G MSP (x; γ, F ALOE ), and G ODIN (x; T, η, γ, F ALOE ), respectively.
Possible Variants. We also derive two other variants of robust training objective for OOD detection. The first one performs adversarial training only on the inliers. We denote this method as ADV, which is equivalent to the objective used in Madry et al. (2017) .
Alternatively, we also considered performing adversarial training on inlier examples while simultaneously performing outlier exposure as in Hendrycks et al. (2018) . We refer to this variant as AOE (adversarial learning with outlier exposure).
We provide ablation studies comparing these variants with ALOE in Section 5.
Experiments
In this section we perform experiments to answer the following questions:
(Q1) Are classic OOD detection methods (e.g. MSP, ODIN, Mahalanobis, and OE) robust against semantic-preserving input perturbations?
(Q2) How does ALOE perform on the robust OOD detection task and the original classification task, compared to existing approaches?
(Q3) How will the hyper-parameters such as adversarial budget affect the experimental results?
We perform extensive experiments to answer these questions. In summary, we have the following findings:
(A1) Classic OOD detection methods such as ODIN, Mahalanobis, and OE fail drastically under our adversarial attack even with a very small attack budget.
(A2) Our method ALOE can significantly improve the performance of OOD detection under our adversarial attack compared to the classic OOD detection methods. Also, we observe that the performance of its variants ADV and AOE is worse than it in this task. And if we combine ALOE with other OOD detection approaches such as ODIN, we can further improve its performance. What's more, ALOE improves model robustness while maintaining almost the same classification accuracy on clean inputs.
(A3) When we increase the adversarial budget , the attack will be stronger and the robust OOD detection performance decreases for classic methods. ALOE consistently improves the performance under different attack strengths.
Next we provide more details.
Setup
In-distribution Datasets. we use GTSRB (Stallkamp et al., 2012) , CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets (Krizhevsky et al., 2009 ) as in-distribution datasets. The pixel values of all the images are normalized to be in the range [0,1]. The details of these datasets can be found in the appendix B.1.
Out-of-distribution Datasets. For auxiliary outlier dataset, we use 80 Million Tiny Images (Torralba et al., 2008) , which is a large-scale, diverse dataset scraped from the web. We follow the same deduplication procedure as in Hendrycks et al. (2018) and remove all examples in this dataset that appear in CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 to ensure that D OE out and D test out are disjoint. For OOD test dataset, we follow the settings in Liang et al. (2017) ; Hendrycks et al. (2018) . For CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, we use six different natural image datasets: SVHN, Textures, Places365, LSUN (crop), LSUN (resize), and iSUN. For GTSRB, we use the following six datasets that are sufficiently different from it: CIFAR-10, Textures, Places365, LSUN (crop), LSUN (resize), and iSUN. Again, the pixel values of all the images are normalized to be in the range [0,1]. The details of these datasets can be found in the appendix B.1. Architectures and Training Configurations. We use the state-of-the-art neural network architecture DenseNet (Huang et al., 2017) . We follow the same setup as in Huang et al. (2017) , with depth L = 100, growth rate k = 12 (Dense-BC) and dropout rate 0. All neural networks are trained with stochastic gradient descent with Nesterov momentum (Duchi et al., 2011; Kingma & Ba, 2014) . Specifically, we train Dense-BC with momentum 0.9 and 2 weight decay with a coefficient of 10 −4 . For GTSRB, we train it for 10 epochs; for CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, we train it for 100 epochs. For in-distribution dataset, we use batch size 64; For outlier exposure with D OE out , we use batch size 128. The initial learning rate of 0.1 decays following a cosine learning rate schedule (Loshchilov & Hutter, 2016) . Hyperparameters. For ODIN (Liang et al., 2017) , we choose temperature scaling parameter T and perturbation magnitude η by validating on a random noise data, which does not depend on prior knowledge of out-of-distribution datasets in test. In all of our experiments, we set T = 1000. We set η = 0.0004 for GTSRB, η = 0.0014 for CIFAR-10, and η = 0.0028 for CIFAR-100. For Mahalanobis (Lee et al., 2018) , we randomly select 1,000 examples from D train in and 1,000 examples from D OE out to train the Logistic Regression model and tune η 2 , where η is chosen from 21 evenly spaced numbers starting from 0 and ending at 0.004, and the optimal parameters are chosen to minimize the FPR at TPR 95%. For OE, AOE and ALOE methods, we fix the regularization parameter λ to be 0.5. In PGD that solves the inner max of ADV, AOE and ALOE, we use step size 1/255, number of steps 255 + 1 , and random start. For our attack algorithm, we set ξ = 1/255 and m = 10 in our experiments. The adversarial budget by default is set to 1/255, however we perform ablation studies by varying the value.
More experiment settings can be found in the Appendix B.1.
Evaluation Metrics
We report main results using three metrics described below. In addition, we also evaluate our method using AURP metric, which is described in Appendix B.2. FPR at 95% TPR. This metric calculates the false positive rate (FPR) on out-of-distribution examples when the true positive rate (TPR) is 95%. Detection Error. This metric corresponds to the minimum mis-detection probability over all possible thresholds γ, which is min γ L(P X , Q X ; G(x; γ)). AUROC. Area Under the Receiver Operating Characteristic curve is a threshold-independent metric (Davis & Goadrich, 2006) . It can be interpreted as the probability that a positive example is assigned a higher detection score than a negative example (Fawcett, 2006) . A perfect detector corresponds to an AUROC score of 100%.
Results
All the values reported in this section are averaged over six OOD test datasets. We provide detailed results for each individual dataset in Appendix B.3. Classic OOD detection methods fail under our attack. As shown in Table 1 , although classic OOD detection methods (e.g. MSP, ODIN, Mahalanobis, OE and OE+ODIN) could perform quite well on detecting natural OOD samples, their performance drops substantially under the attack (even with very minimal attack budget ( = 1/255 and m = 10). For the best-performing OOD detection method (i.e., OE+ODIN), the FPR at 95% TPR increases drastically from 4.17% (without attack) to 99.02% (with attack) when evaluated on the CIFAR-10 dataset. ALOE improves robust OOD detection performance. As shown in Table 1 , our method ALOE could significantly improve the OOD detection performance under the adversarial attack. For example, ALOE can substantially improve the AUROC from 34.29% (state-of-the-art: OE+ODIN) to 92.69% evaluated on the CIFAR-10 dataset. The performance can be further improved when combining ALOE with ODIN. We observe this trend holds consistently on other benchmark datasets GTSRB and CIFAR-100 as in-distribution training data. We also find that adversarial training (ADV) or combining adversarial training with outlier exposure (AOE) yield slightly less competitive results.
To better understand our method, we analyze the distribution of the confidence scores produced by the OOD detectors on SVHN (out-distribution) and CIFAR-10 (in-distribution). As shown in Figure 1 , OE could distinguish in-distribution and out-of-distribution samples quite well since the confidence scores are well separated. However, under our attack, the confidence scores of in-distribution samples move towards 0 and the scores of out-of-distribution samples move towards 1.0, which renders the detector fail to distinguish in-and out-of-distribution samples. Using our method, the confidence scores (under attack) become separable and shift toward the right direction. If we further combine ALOE with ODIN, the scores produced by the detector are even more separated. Effect of adversarial budget . We further perform ablation study on the adversarial budget and analyze how this affects performance. On GTSRB and CIFAR-10 dataset, we perform comparison by varying = 1/255, 2/255, 3/255, 4/255. The results are reported in Table 2 . We observe that as we increase , the performance on classic OOD detection methods (e.g. MSP, ODIN, Mahalanobis, OE, OE+ODIN) drops significantly under our attack: the FPR at 95% TPR reaches almost 100% for all those methods. We also observe that our methods ALOE (and ALOE+ODIN) consistently improves the results under our attack compared to those classic methods. Table 3 , the metric in general is low for both classic and robust OOD detection methods, which suggests that common adversarial examples are closer to in-distribution rather than OOD. Classification performance of image classifier f (x). In addition to OOD detection, we also verify the accuracy and robustness on the original classification task. The results are presented in 
Analysis
The interesting questions related to our method are: (1) why unlabeled auxiliary data from U X helps?
(2) why the robustness of the detector G on U X generalizes to a different distribution Q X ?
To get some intuition for these questions, we adopt the domain adaption framework (Ben-David et al., 2010) . Recall that in domain adaptation there are two domains s, t, each being a distribution over the input space X and label space {0, 1}. A classifier is trained on s then applied on t. We view our OOD detection problem as classification, where the source domain s is P X with labels 1 and U X with labels 0, and the target domain t is P X with labels 1 and Q X with label 0.
CIFAR-10
MSP (Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2016) 10.75 ODIN (Liang et al., 2017) 4.02 Mahalanobis (Lee et al., 2018) 7.13 OE (Hendrycks et al., 2018) 12.22 OE+ODIN 12.95 ADV (Madry et al., 2017) 7.69 AOE 11.18 ALOE (ours) 8.85 ALOE+ODIN (ours) 8.71
CIFAR-100
MSP (Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2016) 0.06 ODIN (Liang et al., 2017) 0.74 Mahalanobis Lee et al. (2018) 4.29 OE (Hendrycks et al., 2018) 4.36 OE+ODIN 5.21 ADV (Madry et al., 2017) 3.14 AOE 8.08 ALOE (ours) 7.32 ALOE+ODIN (ours) 7.06 
Denote the loss of G in the source domain as: Figure 2 : An illustration example to explain why UX helps to get a good detector Gr. With UX , we can prune away hypotheses Gr for any r ≥ 1.9. Thus, the resulting detector Gr can detect OOD samples from QX successfully and robustly. is the loss difference of G and G on distribution D. The divergence upper bounds the change of the hypothesis loss difference between Q X and U X . If it is small, then for any G, G ∈ G where G has a smaller risk than G in U X , we know that G will also have a smaller (or not too larger) risk than G in Q X . That is, if the divergence is small, then the ranking of the hypotheses w.r.t. the loss is roughly the same in both distributions. This rank-preserving property thus makes sure that a good hypothesis learned in U X will also be good for Q X . Now we show that, if d G (Q X , U X ) is small (i.e., Q X and U X are aligned w.r.t. the class G), then a detector G with small loss in the source domain will also have small loss in the target domain.
Theorem 1. For any G ∈ G,
Proof. See the Appendix A.
The test error of the detector is bounded by three terms: the best error, the error on the training distributions, and the divergence between Q X and U X . Assuming that there exists a ground-truth detector with a small test error, and that the optimization can lead to a small training error, the test error is then characterized by the divergence. So in this case, as long as the rankings of the hypotheses (according to the error) on Q X and U X are similar, detectors learned on U X can generalize to Q X .
An illustration example. In this example, the in-distribution P X is uniform over the disk around the origin in R 2 with radius 1, U X is uniform over the disk around (0, 3) with radius 1, and Q X is uniform over the disk around (3, 0) with radius 1. Assume the adversary budget is = 0.1, i.e., Ω = { δ 2 ≤ 0.1}. The hypothesis class for the detector contains all functions of the form G r (x) = I[ x 2 ≥ r] with parameter r. See Figure 2 .
The example first shows the effect of the unlabeled data: U X helps to prune away hypotheses G r for any r ≥ 1.9. Furthermore, it also shows how learning over U X can generalize to Q X . Although Q X and U X have non-overlapping supports, U X help to calibrate the error of the hypotheses so that any good detector trained on P X and U X can be used for distinguishing P X and Q X . Formally, the d G is small in Theorem 1.
The analysis also shows the importance of training on perturbed instances from the unlabeled data U X . Not using perturbation is equivalent to using Ω = {0}. In this case, the analysis shows that it only guarantees the error on unperturbed instances from Q X , even if Q X and U X has small divergence and the optimization gives small training error.
Related Work
Out-of-Distribution Detection. Various papers (Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2016; Lakshminarayanan et al., 2017) have reported that discriminative neural networks can produce overconfident predictions on out-of-distribution inputs. Liang et al. propose a method which can improve performance of OOD detectors using calibrated score (Guo et al., 2017) . In addition, they make the maximum softmax probability more discriminative between out-of-distribution and in-distribution examples by pre-processing input data with small perturbations. Some methods also modify the neural networks by re-training or fine-tuning on some auxiliary anomalous data that are or realistic (Hendrycks et al., 2018) or artificially generated by GANs (Lee et al., 2017) . Many other works (Subramanya et al., 2017; Malinin & Gales, 2018; Bevandić et al., 2018 ) also regularize the model to have lower confidence on anomalous examples . In this paper, we show that existing OOD detection methods can be easily fooled by adding small adversarial perturbations. Unlike previous work, we are the first to investigate the robust version of the out-of-distribution problem. Density Estimation. Generative models (Dinh et al., 2016; Kingma & Welling, 2013; Rezende et al., 2014; Van den Oord et al., 2016; Tabak & Turner, 2013) can be alternative approaches for detecting OOD examples, as they directly estimate the in-distribution density and can declare a test sample to be out-of-distribution if it lies in the low-density regions. However, as shown by Nalisnick et al., deep generative models can assign a high likelihood to out-of-distribution data, which urges caution against using deep generative models to detect out-of-distribution inputs. Yet, deep generative models can detect out-of-distribution inputs when using alternative metrics (Choi & Jang, 2018) , likelihood ratio (Ren et al., 2019; Serrà et al., 2019) , and modified training technique (Hendrycks et al., 2018) .
Recently, Pope et al. show that flow-based generative models are extremely sensitive to two types of adversarial attacks: one that minimizes the likelihood scores of in-distribution samples, while the other that maximizes the likelihood scores of out-of-distribution ones. Adversarial Robustness. Although the detectors based on deep models perform quite well on many OOD detection tasks, they might not be robust against minimal input perturbations since the behaviors of neural networks have been showed to be very brittle if we add small perturbations to the inputs. A well-known phenomenon of adversarial examples (Goodfellow et al., 2014) has received great attention in recent years. Many defense methods have been proposed to address this problem. One of the most effective methods is adversarial training (Madry et al., 2017) which uses robust optimization techniques to render deep learning models resistant to adversarial attacks. Another brittleness of deep learning models is their interpretation is fragile (Ghorbani et al., 2019) : adding small input perturbations will make deep learning models generate totally different explanations for their predictions while maintaining their correct predictions. A method called robust attribution regularization (Chen et al., 2019) , which also uses robust optimization, is proposed to solve this problem. In this paper, we show that the OOD detectors built from deep models are also very brittle under small perturbations, and propose a method to mitigate this issue using techniques from robust optimization.
Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce a novel and challenging problem, Robust Out-of-Distribution Detection, and propose an adversarial attack algorithm to evaluate the robustness of classic OOD detection methods under this new problem setting. We find that state-of-the-art OOD detection methods can fail catastrophically under such an attack. We then take a first step to solve this challenge by proposing an effective algorithm called ALOE, which can substantially improve the robust OOD detection performance. We empirically analyze our method under different parameter settings and optimization objectives, and provide theoretical insights behind our approach. Future work involves exploring alternative semantic-preserving perturbations beyond adversarial attacks.
Supplementary Material
A Proof of Theorem 1
We have
Therefore,
Taking inf over G * ∈ G completes the proof. In-distribution Dataset. We provide the details of in-distribution datasets below:
1. CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. The CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 (Krizhevsky et al., 2009 ) have 10 and 100 classes respectively. Both datasets consist of 50,000 training images and 10,000 test images. 2. GTSRB. The German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark (GTSRB) (Stallkamp et al., 2012) is a dataset of color images depicting 43 different traffic signs. has a testing set of 10,000 images of 10 different scenes Yu et al. (2015) . We construct two datasets, LSUN-C and LSUN-R, by randomly cropping image patches of size 32 × 32 and downsampling each image to size 32 × 32, respectively. 5. iSUN. The iSUN Xu et al. (2015) consists of a subset of SUN images. We include the entire collection of 8925 images in iSUN and downsample each image to size 32 × 32. 6. CIFAR-10. We use the 10,000 test images of CIFAR-10 as OOD test set for GTSRB.
B.2 Additional Evaluation Metric
AUPR. It is the Area under the Precision-Recall curve, which is another threshold independent metric Manning et al. (1999) ; Saito & Rehmsmeier (2015) . The PR curve is a graph showing the precision=TP/(TP+FP) and recall=TP/(TP+FN) against each other. The metric AUPR-In and AUPR-Out denote the area under the precision-recall curve where in-distribution and out-of-distribution images are specified as positives, respectively.
B.3 Complete Experimental Results
We report the performance of OOD detectors on each of the six OOD test datasets in Table 5 (GTSRB), Table 6 (CIFAR-10) and LSUN-C
